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I. Introduction
The legal rights of gay and lesbian individuals and groups, as well as those of
other sexual minorities, have been the subject of debate, legislation, and litigation
* Catherine Connolly is a Professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of
Wyoming. She earned a Ph.D. in Sociology (1992) and a J.D. (cum laude, 1991) from SUNYBuffalo. She is currently serving as a legislator in the Wyoming House of Representatives (2008–
present). The author would like to thank Lois Berry, Alison Harkin, and the Wyoming Law Review
editors for their comments and suggestions on drafts of this article.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2011

1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 11 [2011], No. 1, Art. 5

126

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 11

for several decades.1 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people face
legal challenges that non-LGBT citizens do not.2 Both the LGBT rights movement
and groups opposing the inclusion of LGBT persons within legal protections have
turned to the courts and legislatures. This article outlines the current status of the
law—both state and federal—regarding LGBT individuals.3 Furthermore, this
article offers suggestions for interpreting current legal issues related to the LGBT
community in Wyoming.4 With the limited exceptions noted in this article, little
Wyoming case or statutory law has addressed these issues.5 This article begins
with an overview of the LGBT population in the state.6 Next, relevant federal
and state constitutional law is examined.7 This is followed by a brief overview
of LGBT issues, such as those related to marriage, family, employment, and
hate crimes.8

A. The Gay Population of Wyoming
The prestigious Williams Institute at the University of California, Los Angeles
(Institute) publishes regular reports designed to advance sexual orientation law
and public policy through rigorous independent research and scholarship.9 The
Institute disseminates its findings to judges, legislators, policymakers, media, and
the public. In its memorandum titled Wyoming–Sexual Orientation and Gender
1
There is no consensus on the most accurate label or definition of “sexual minority.” Terms
used often include gay, lesbian, bisexual, queer, transgendered, and intersexed, even though these
individuals and groups may not share the same characteristics, experiences, or desires for change. In
addition, acronyms abound combining initial letters from these groups; common examples include
GLBT, LGBT, GLBTQI, etc. Less common, especially in more recent scholarship, is the term
“homosexual” used to define a person; instead the term is more acceptably used to define a type of
sexual behavior. Throughout this article, LGBT will be used.
2
This article will address several such issues. See infra Part II (discussing the history of
regulation of same-sex sexual behavior); infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text (noting the
limitations in most jurisdictions on same-sex couples to marry and form families); infra Part IV
(indicating the inability to bring forth claims of employment discrimination based on anti-LGBT
animus); infra Part V (addressing homophobic violence).
3
The status of the law regarding issues related to same-sex sexuality is changing rapidly. All
cites are current at the time this article goes to press.
4
See infra Part III.C (discussing same-sex marriage in Wyoming); infra notes 186–92 and
accompanying text (noting potential changes to LGBT employment issues in Wyoming); infra
notes 215–17 and accompanying text (addressing hate crime laws).
5
See infra Part III.D (discussing the relevance of homosexuality in child custody disputes);
infra Part IV (discussing employment discrimination); infra Part V.B (discussing the inadmissibility
of a “gay panic” defense).
6

See infra Part I.A.

7

See infra Part II.

See infra Part III (discussing marriage issues); infra Part III.D (discussing family issues);
infra Part IV (discussing employment issues); infra Part V (discussing hate crime issues).
8

9
Williams Inst., http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/home.html (last visited Nov.
27, 2010).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss1/5

2

Connolly: Gay Rights in Wyoming: A Review of Federal and State Law

2011

Gay Rights in Wyoming

127

Identity Law and Documentation of Discrimination, the Institute begins its report
with the following overview of the status of gay life and rights in Wyoming:
According to several press reports, gay and lesbian Wyomingites
tend to be extraordinarily private about their sexual orientation,
in part, out of fear. As former U.S. Senator Alan Simpson put it,
“Wyoming is not the most remarkable place for the tolerance of
homosexuality.” State representative Mike Massie of Laramie told
a reporter that there is a “touch of homophobia in the Wyoming
legislature.” As one Time Magazine article reported, a gay man
who recently relocated to Wyoming with his same-sex partner
“‘didn’t expect that people in Wyoming would be as closeted as
they are’. . . . One reason is that gay bashings still occur. Not
long ago, [the man reported], a gay couple w[as] assaulted in a
bar in a rural part of Wyoming. One of the victims had to see a
doctor for bruised ribs and cartilage damage. But the men didn’t
file a police report. ‘I suspect it has to do with them not wanting
to out themselves to the police . . . . They were embarrassed to
say they were gay.’” The author also “met a lesbian couple who
have lived in the same Casper home for 21 years and yet have
never spoken openly with the neighbors about their love for each
other. Instead, they let people think they are just roommates.”
According to the reporter, “Wyoming has constructed an entire
culture around the fraught military concept known as ‘Don’t
ask, don’t tell.’ Nearly every Wyomingite I met used that
phrase, or a version of it, with respect to homosexuality. ‘People
have an open mind but a closed mouth here,’” said former
Senator Simpson.10
Conservative estimates report more than 11,000 LGBT people, single and
coupled, live in Wyoming.11 The data presented in this report relies heavily on the
2000 Census information about household relationships; thus, more demographic
information about couples, rather than single LGBT individuals, is known
and reported.
Williams Inst., Memorandum: Wyoming—Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Law and Documentation of Discrimination 1 (Sept. 2009) (footnotes omitted), available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/WilliamsInstitute/programs/ENDA/Wyoming%20Final.pdf.
10

See Adam P. Romero et al., Williams Inst., Census Snapshot: Wyoming 1 (2008),
available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/WyomingCensusSnapshot.pdf.
While the 2000 Census indicated that there were 807 same-sex couples in Wyoming, estimates
from 2005 have increased that number to 1044 same-sex couples and indicate gay couples live in
every county. Id. However, accurately capturing the numbers of sexual minorities has been and
will continue to be a problem. While the 2000 Census asked about same-sex partners living in the
same household, such questions did not capture single individuals or partnered couples not living
together. In addition, many same-sex respondents might lie about their sexual orientation due to
fear of negative reprisals at work, home, or in their communities. Thus, these numbers should
11
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The “open minded, closed mouth” way of living masks a large and diverse
portion of Wyoming’s population. The available data on same-sex couples helps
reveal this significant but quieted population and demonstrates that same-sex
couples experience Wyoming differently than married couples. In Wyoming,
the number of males and females in same-sex couples is about the same.12 These
couples are slightly younger, on average, than individuals in married couples.13
Wyoming’s same-sex couples also are more racially and ethnically diverse than
Wyoming’s married couples.14 In addition, individuals in same-sex couples are less
likely to be employed than married couples.15
Contrary to a popular stereotype, the annual earnings of individuals in samesex couples are significantly lower than married individuals.16 Not surprisingly,
the average household income is lower for same-sex households than for married
couples.17 Likewise, the median income of same-sex-couple households in
Wyoming is lower than married couples.18
In terms of employment, individuals in same-sex couples are more likely to
work in the public sector than their married counterparts.19 Even though the
military has had policies excluding gay men and lesbians from service, some
individuals in same-sex couples indicated that they are veterans.20 In comparison
with married couples, individuals in same-sex Wyoming couples are more likely

be considered conservative estimates. A recent study also indicated that similar undercounting is
expected with the 2010 Census. See Press Release, The Williams Inst., 2010 Census Analysis of
Same-Sex Couples: 1 in 7 not identified, 30% in legal relationships (Sept. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/pdf/2010CensusAnalysis_PR_Sept7.pdf.
12
Romero et al., supra note 11, at 1 (estimating fifty-one percent of same-sex couples consist
of male partners and forty-nine percent consist of female partners).
13
Id. (noting individuals in same-sex couples are forty-one years old, on average, while
individuals in married couples are forty-eight years old, on average).

Id. at 3 (noting eighteen percent of LGBT couples are non-white, compared with eight
percent of married couples).
14

Id. at 1 (noting the percentage of employed individuals in same-sex couples is sixty percent,
compared with sixty-eight percent of individuals in married couples).
15

Id. at 2 (noting that, on average, men in same-sex couples in Wyoming earn $29,500
annually, while married men earn $40,764; women in same-sex couples earn $11,306 on average,
compared with $18,419 for married women).
16

Id. (noting the average household income is $47,322 for same-sex households and $60,746
for married couples).
17

Id. (noting the median income for same-sex households is $33,700, less than that of
married couples at $50,720).
18

19
Id. (noting thirty-seven percent of individuals in same-sex couples work in the public
sector, versus twenty-three percent of married individuals).
20

Id. (noting eight percent of those in same-sex couples indicated that they are veterans).
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to have at least one partner who is disabled and aged sixty-five or over.21 Not
surprisingly, given that they have fewer economic resources, same-sex couples are
less likely than married couples to own their homes.22
Same-sex couples also are raising children in Wyoming.23 Many are raising
children under age eighteen.24 A typical same-sex home with children has, on
average, more children than a married household.25 As of 2005, many Wyoming
children were living in households headed by same-sex couples.26
The above data illustrate a real and complicated picture of the LGBT
population—a portion of the Wyoming population that has fallen under the legal
radar. These LGBT individuals and couples, many of whom have children, live
and work in the state. How does their LGBT status affect their legal claims?

II. Same-Sex Sexuality and the
United States and Wyoming Constitutions
A. The United States Constitution
As with other minorities in the United States, the legal claims of LGBT
individuals are often heard under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.27 The first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment has two parts and declares, “No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”28 Together, these provisions have
been the cornerstone of suits regarding equality, opportunity, and access to

21
Id. (noting fifty-five percent of individuals in same-sex Wyoming couples have at least
one partner who is disabled, compared with twenty-seven percent of those in married couples.
Twenty-three percent of same-sex couples have one partner who is aged sixty-five or over, compared
to seventeen percent of married couples).

Id. (noting sixty-three percent of same-sex Wyoming couples are homeowners, while
eighty-three percent of married couples are).
22

23
Id. at 2–3 (noting same-sex couples raising children do so with far fewer resources than
married couples).
24

Id. at 2 (noting twenty percent of same-sex couples are raising children under age eighteen).

Id. (noting a same-sex couple with children typically has an average of 2.4 children,
compared with 2.0 for married parents).
25

Id. (noting an estimated 501 Wyoming children are living in households headed by samesex couples).
26

27
See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing minority claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
28

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2011

5

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 11 [2011], No. 1, Art. 5

130

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 11

the liberties associated with citizenship and justice.29 While the constitutional
safeguard of due process has both a procedural and substantive element, LGBT
rights claims often invoke the unenumerated rights of liberty and privacy, which
are protected through substantive due process and considered “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”30
The United States Supreme Court applies several levels of review to
substantive due process challenges. First, if a state attempts to limit liberty or
privacy by statute, the Court holds the law must be in furtherance of a legitimate
governmental objective.31 The typical test for such a determination is whether the
law is rationally related to the purported legitimate state goal. Second, if a court
deems the liberty interest at stake a fundamental right, then the court applies a
more rigorous test.32 This level of review, known as strict scrutiny, inquires into
whether a compelling state interest is furthered by the violation of the purported
right, and whether the law in question was narrowly tailored to address that very
particular state interest.33
See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting the exclusion of women
from juries); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (dismantling racially segregated schools);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (prohibiting the exclusion of blacks from juries). A
right to privacy was articulated by the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29

30

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

The Court has not been wholly consistent in its formulation of a constitutional standard
against which to measure statutes. For example, in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, the Court
stated, “[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). The Court articulated an
even more deferential standard in McGowan v. Maryland: “State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality.” 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961). In New Orleans v. Dukes, the Court held the Equal
Protection Clause is satisfied as long as the classification is “rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Of course, this standard begs the questions of what is rational
and what is legitimate. These questions have been the subject of debate in subsequent cases invoking
equal protection and due process and are often at the heart of many gay rights issues.
31

Fundamental rights are not found in the text of the Constitution. The Court has ruled
such rights include the right to vote in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621,
625–26 (1969); the right to travel between states in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969);
the right to make reproductive choices in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; and the right to access to the judicial process in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 625 (1996). See infra notes 50–60 and accompanying text (discussing Romer v. Evans).
32

Compare Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (triggering strict scrutiny when the statute singles out
for special treatment a class of persons the court finds to be a suspect classification), and Romer, 517
U.S. at 630 (stating the criteria for suspect classification include a history of discrimination, political
powerlessness, and immutable characteristics, which combined “command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian process”), with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973) (holding such classifications have been found in terms of alienage), Graham v. Dept. of
Publ. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage), McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92
(1964) (race), Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644–46 (1948) (nationality), and Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (race).
33
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While early substantive due process cases protected the rights of corporations
and employers to be free of governmental regulation, later cases included
challenges to laws that infringed upon liberty and privacy in issues related to
marriage, family, and procreation. For example, using the notion of substantive
due process, the Supreme Court ruled states may not forbid citizens from
purchasing or using contraceptives.34 Nor may states forbid abortions.35 Statutes
forbidding consensual sodomy were among the last bastions of state regulation of
sexual behavior between adults.36
Until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, states were permitted
to prohibit sodomy.37 The facts of the Lawrence case are straightforward: The
petitioners, who were engaged in consensual sodomy in the privacy of their
home, were arrested by a police officer who had entered and witnessed the act.38
Subsequently, the petitioners were convicted of violating a Texas statute forbidding
two persons of the same sex from engaging in certain intimate sexual conduct.39
On appeal, the conviction was upheld with the court ruling that the Texas statute
was not unconstitutional following the Supreme Court’s reasoning and ruling in
Bowers v. Hardwick.40
The Lawrence Court considered three issues: (1) whether a Texas statute
prohibiting sodomy by same-sex but not different-sex couples violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) whether a criminal
conviction for sodomy violated the petitioners’ liberty and property interests;
and (3) whether Bowers v. Hardwick, a case that upheld Georgia’s anti-sodomy
statute, should be overturned.41 The Court in Lawrence declined to address the
equal protection issue presented in the first question, and thus it did not address
whether the same-sex plaintiffs as a class of citizens were being treated differently

Classifications based on gender have not been labeled “suspect” but have been subject to review
between rational and strict scrutiny, sometimes referred to as a quasi-suspect classification with an
intermediate level of review; that is, gender-based distinctions “must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
34

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.

35

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).

But see 1568 Montgomery Highway v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319 passim (Ala. 2010)
(upholding a state statute forbidding the sale of “sex toys”). While statutes regarding sodomy have
often been considered the last frontier in terms of state regulation of sexual behavior, state statutes
forbidding the sale of sex toys have been held constitutional even though the explanation for the ban
is the preservation of procreative sex as a state interest.
36

37

539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).

38

Id. at 562–63.

39

Id. at 563.

40

Id.; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

41

539 U.S. at 563; see Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
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from heterosexual couples.42 While the court did acknowledge that an argument
about different treatment could be made, Justice Kennedy, in his opinion for the
majority, declined to do so.43
In addressing the second question, the Lawrence Court found the Texas statute
unconstitutional, ruling that it violated the Due Process Clause. The Lawrence
42
539 U.S. 558. However, such classifications are wrought with incoherence. Evan
Gerstman, The Constitutional Underclass: Gays, Lesbians, and the Failure of Class-Based
Protection 8 (1999). Gerstman argues while the standard is clear when “a law discriminates
against racial minorities . . . the law will be struck down unless it is narrowly tailored to further
a compelling governmental interest. If a law discriminates against women, it will be struck down
unless it serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives.” Id. at 8–9. Gays and lesbians cannot rely on such clear legal standards. Id. In
making this argument, Gerstman points out that the criterion for a suspect or quasi-suspect class
is its lack of political power. Id. at 9. While gays and lesbians (and other classes such as the elderly)
have been denied enhanced protection, whites and men, two politically powerful classes, have been
granted such status in the anti-affirmative action cases. Id.; see, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). In these cases,
the courts have not asked them to prove political powerlessness, instead interchanging the notion
of a suspect class (white or male) with a suspect classification (race or sex). Thus, “[b]y switching
between the terms suspect class and suspect classification, the Supreme Court can require some groups
to show that they are politically powerless but allow other, far more politically powerful groups to
benefit from strong constitutional protection.” Gerstman, supra, at 9.
43

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. According to Justice Kennedy:
Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the
conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects,
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is
made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive
validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal
protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.

Id. at 574. In addition, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence acknowledged that gay rights
issues brought before the Court can be evaluated as either substantive due process cases based on
conduct or as equal protection cases based on status. Id. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O’Connor concurred with the majority but her reasoning was based on the equal protection
claim rather than substantive due process. While the prevalence of arrest for violating the Texas
“homosexual conduct law” (as well as prosecutions in other jurisdictions with similar statues) were
few and far between, the existence of such laws were, as Justice O’Connor pointed out, harbingers
of not only negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians but also of state-sanctioned discrimination:
[The] petitioners convictions, if upheld, would disqualify them from or restrict their
ability to engage in a variety of professions, including medicine, athletic training,
and interior design. Indeed, were petitioners to move to one of four States, their
convictions would require them to register as sex offenders to local law enforcement.
Id. at 581 (citations omitted). In doing so, O’Connor used a slightly higher level of review than
“mere” rational basis, stating that “[w]hen a law exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular
group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws
under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 579.
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Court based its opinion firmly on substantive due process, declaring that to do
otherwise would allow Texas to criminalize sodomy if it extended its current law
to conduct between different-sex as well as same-sex couples.44
The basis for the Court’s decision in Lawrence was to place liberty interests
in intimate sexual conduct beyond the arm of the state.45 The Court rejected
the argument by Texas that it had a “legitimate state interest in legislatively
expressing the long-standing moral traditions of the State against homosexual
conduct, and in discouraging its citizens—whether they be homosexual, bisexual,
or heterosexual—from choosing to engage in what is still perceived to be immoral
conduct.”46 The Court ruled the State could not use its power to enforce this view
of morality on the whole society through the operation of its criminal law.47
Lastly, the Court addressed its decision in Bowers:
The central holding of Bowers . . . demeans the lives of
homosexual persons.
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not
trivial. The offense, to be sure, is but a class C misdemeanor,
a minor offense in the Texas legal system. Still, it remains a
criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the
persons charged. The petitioners will bear on their record the
history of their criminal convictions.48
Ultimately, the Court ruled that the historical grounds the Bowers Court used in
upholding the Georgia statute were overstated; thus the Bowers Court incorrectly
viewed the liberty interest in sexual privacy too narrowly, and the holding in
Bowers “should be and now is overruled.”49

44

Id. at 575 (majority opinion), 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

45

Id. at 567 (majority opinion).

46

Brief of Respondent at 27, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 470184.

47

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.

48

Id. at 575; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Specifically, the Court traced English criminal law in the
colonial times and found that “[e]arly American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals
as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally . . . .” Id. at
559. Similarly, the Court commented that nineteenth-century sodomy indictments addressed the
predatory acts of an adult man against a minor, not another adult. Id. at 569. Furthermore, it
was not until the 1970s that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution. Id.
Ultimately, the Court concluded, “[T]he historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex
. . . . Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.” Id.
at 571.
49
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In the Lawrence decision, both the majority and concurring opinions cited the
Court’s ruling in Romer v. Evans, a 1996 case that invalidated Colorado’s passage
of Amendment 2 on the basis of equal protection reasoning.50 In Romer, the Court
found unconstitutional a voter-approved Colorado constitutional amendment
because it identified “persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual either
by ‘orientation, conduct, practices or relationships’” as a solitary class of persons
and deprived this class of protection under state and local antidiscrimination
laws.51 In rendering Amendment 2 unconstitutional, the Romer Court concluded
Amendment 2 was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected,” and
that it had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose: “[I]ts sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reason offered for it that the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”52
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the argument by Colorado
that LGBT individuals would be granted “special rights,” an argument proffered
by the state in its defense.53 Instead, he declared that the protection offered by
antidiscrimination laws was not a special right, simply that anti-discrimination
laws protected fundamental rights already enjoyed by all other citizens: “To the
contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon those persons alone.
Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without
constraint.”54 Justice Kennedy concluded, “Amendment 2 . . . is at once too
narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them
protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons
from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in
our jurisprudence.”55
Even though the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling against Amendment 2
applied strict scrutiny based on the notion of preserving a fundamental right of
access to the judicial process, Justice Kennedy’s opinion side-stepped the issue of
constitutional review for LGBT citizens.56 Thus, neither Romer nor Lawrence, the
two recent Supreme Court cases addressing Fourteenth Amendment “gay rights”

50

Id. at 574; see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 624). Contrasting sharply with
the passage of Amendment 2, in 2007 the Colorado legislature and governor approved a measure
modifying the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act to include sexual orientation and gender identity.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-401 (2010).
51

52

Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.

53

Id. at 631.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 633.

56

Id. at 631–33.
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issues, clearly dealt with the standard of review of LGBT citizens’ claims.57 In
both cases the Court avoided addressing equal protection claims that would have
required it to establish a level of review. Instead, the Court in Romer examined
the passage of Amendment 2 as a violation of a fundamental right which
automatically received strict scrutiny.58 In Lawrence, the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of the Texas anti-sodomy statute using substantive due process,
concluding that Americans have a liberty interest in private sexual conduct that

57
See Susan Mezey, Queers in Court: Gay Rights Law and Public Policy 62–65 (2007);
Joyce Murdoch & Deb Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. The Supreme Court
481 (2001). However, several recent decisions bear comment. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, an Irish-American LGBT group was legally excluded from
the famous St. Patrick’s Day parade in Boston because the parade organizers had a discriminatory
policy excluding gays from membership. 515 U.S. 557, 572–82 (1995). The Court ruled that
public demonstrations by private organizations may legally exclude groups who impart a message
the organizers reject even when the event is perceived as public rather than private. Id. Similarly, in
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court ruled a private organization, including one with a public
persona such as the Boy Scouts, could exclude LGBT individuals from participation. 530 U.S.
640, 661 (2000). In contrast to such cases that seem to permit discriminatory animus regarding
LGBT individuals and groups, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the University of California’s
Hastings College of the Law need not fund a campus group, the Christian Legal Society, a campus
organization that had membership requirements in violation of the campus non-discrimination
policy. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2995
(2010). The Court ruled that the College did not have to fund a group that violated the school
policy requiring all recognized student groups to be open to every student. Id. at 2973–74.

Until 1991, U.S. law barred all immigration benefits to gay and lesbian individuals, citing
“psychopathic inferiority” or “mental defect.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1990). Congress removed
the express bar on U.S. visits and immigration by LGBT foreign nationals in 1990. Immigration
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990). Moreover, LGBT persecution
as a basis for asylum in the United States is possible. For example, Matter of Toboso-Alfonso became
a precedent for all Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) decision-makers, recognizing
homosexuals as members of “a particular social group” under asylum law. 20 I. & N. Dec. 819,
822–23 (B.I.A. 1990). The Ninth Circuit extended this definition to recognize asylum claims by
some transgendered individuals in Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). On
March 1, 2003, the INS was disbanded and its functions were transferred to departments within
the Department of Homeland Security. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcements, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are currently
responsible for the functions formerly held by the INS.
Perhaps no issue is changing as rapidly as this article is going to print as the recent activity
regarding the Clinton Administration’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy restricting service by
gay and lesbian soldiers in the military to those who keep their sexuality a secret. A suit filed in 2004
by the Log Cabin Republicans, a conservative gay organization acting on behalf of gay soldiers,
was recently decided in a U.S. District Court by Judge Virginia Phillips who ruled that the policy
was unconstitutional. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, at 969 (C.D.
Cal. 2010). In a controversial ruling, Judge Phillips then enjoined the Pentagon from enforcing
the policy. Id. at 916. In addition to the federal district court ruling discussed above, the Military
Readiness Enhancement Act of 2009 has been introduced in Congress. H.R. 1283, 111th Cong.
(2009). It would replace the DADT policy with one of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation as a means to enhance the military’s readiness. Id.
58

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2011

11

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 11 [2011], No. 1, Art. 5

136

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 11

a state has no rational basis for criminalizing.59 Neither opinion tackled head on
if LGBT citizens were entitled to strict or immediate level review for Fourteenth
Amendment claims. While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions in each of these
cases discussed the ways in which LGBT individuals were negatively targeted,
he did not address sexual orientation or gender identity as a category of analysis
deserving of a heightened level of review. As such, the default level of review
remains at the lowest level.60

B. The Wyoming Constitution
The Wyoming Constitution contains two articles similar to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. First, Article I, Section 6 of the
Wyoming Constitution, Due Process of Law, states: “No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Article 1, Section 2,
Equality of all, states: “In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, all members of the human race are equal.”
Wyoming courts interpret due process as both procedural and substantive
under the Wyoming Constitution.61 In Moreno v. Department of Revenue &
Taxation, the court commented:
This court recognizes that the U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV
and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6, contain procedural and substantive
components. Federal substantive due process protections apply
indirectly to the states through U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV,
and state constitutional protections under Wyo. Const. art. 1,
§ 6, must guard the minimum due process rights guaranteed
by the federal protections. Under the substantive component
of those constitutional provisions the exercise of the state
police power must promote a legitimate public objective with
reasonable means. A due process infringement of an individual’s
nonfundamental life, liberty, or property entitlement
occurs only when it amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of
that entitlement.62
The substantive component bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions,
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.63 In addition,
Wyoming has largely adopted the two-tiered scrutiny employed by the federal
59

See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
60

61

Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 727 (Wyo. 1985).

62

775 P.2d 497, 500 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted).

63

Cheyenne Airport Bd., 707 P.2d at 727.
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courts in analyzing substantive due process and equal protection challenges. That
is, when a statute affects a fundamental interest or creates an inherently suspect
classification, the court must strictly scrutinize the statute to determine if it is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.64 However, if the statute affects
only ordinary interests in the economic and social welfare area, the court need
only determine that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state objective.65
In Wyoming, courts analyze equal protection claims using the following test:
(1) what class is harmed by the legislation and has that group
been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our laws; (2) what
is the public purpose to be served by the law; (3) what is the
characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies disparate
treatment; and (4) how are the characteristics used to distinguish
people for disparate treatment relevant to the purpose the
challenged law purportedly intends to serve.66
Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court has noted that “the Wyoming
Constitution offers more robust protection against legal discrimination than the
federal constitution.”67 While—not surprisingly—no gay rights issues have been
heard under either of these provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, plaintiffs also
have not used these sections to argue against illegal race or sex discrimination.68
64

Id.

65

Id. The court noted:
When the legislative enactment lies in the economic and social welfare area, and
when there are no suspect criteria or fundamental interests involved, the court will,
in testing the enactment, inquire only as to whether the regulation is of debatable
reasonableness. In other words, if the court perceives that the legislature had some
arguable basis for choosing the end and the means, it will sustain the regulation at
least as to compliance with substantive due process. Only when a regulation amounts
to an arbitrary deprivation of regulatees’ property will it be deemed to violate the
dictates of substantive due process. As we said in Washakie County School District No.
One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, 333 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.
Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28: “When an ordinary [nonfundamental constitutional] interest
is involved, then a court merely examines to determine whether there is a rational
relationship between a classification . . . and a legitimate state objective.”

Id.
Allhusen v. State ex rel. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878,
886 (Wyo. 1995) (making a determination prior to the 2001 amendments to the Mental Health
Professions Practice Act).
66

67

Id. at 884.

There are, of course, some exceptions. For example, a case of race discrimination was brought
in Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 920 (Wyo. 2000). In this case, Jennings argued unsuccessfully that
his criminal conviction should be overturned because no African Americans served on the jury. Id.
In ruling against the appellant, the court found there was no purposeful rejection of the one African
American juror in the pool. Id. In the case of In re Adoption of BGH, the court rejected a father’s
claim of illegal sex discrimination for the failure to award him child custody. 930 P.2d 371, 381
(Wyo. 1996).
68
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III. Gay and Lesbian Relationships and Family Issues
The most visible and, some would argue, most important LGBT rights issue in
the United States (if not globally) during the early part of the twenty-first century
is the recognition of same-sex relationships. For many individuals, marriage is a
holy and sacred coupling. However, marriage, in this article, is strictly addressed
as a civil contract regulated by the state.69 Laws regarding marriage grant the
parties involved a vast number of legal rights and entitlements, as well as impose
duties and obligations. No fewer than 1000 federal rights ensue from marriage.70
In Wyoming, state statutes include more than 235 provisions in which terms such
as “marriage” and “spouse” are used.71 Included in those federal and state statutes
are important provisions regarding Social Security benefits, immigration, health
insurance, estate taxes, family leave, criminal immunity, and pensions. Moreover,
marriage is a necessary and important element of policies pertaining to other
family issues, including divorce, child custody, adoption, and foster care.
In Baker v. Nelson, one of the earliest cases to address same-sex marriage,
the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the state did not violate the federal
Constitution by denying a civil marriage license to a same-sex couple.72 The
issue remained dormant, at least in the courts, for about two decades, until it
was revived in Hawaii.73 A 1993 Hawaii court decision suggested the Hawaii
Constitution gave same-sex as well as different-sex couples a fundamental right to
marry.74 While the Hawaii case was winding its way through the appeal process,
no marriage licenses were issued to same-sex couples. In addition, forces opposed
to the possible legalization of same-sex marriage pushed Congress in 1996 to pass

See infra note 84 and accompanying text. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, finding of fact number
nineteen states:
69

Marriage in the United States has always been a civil matter. Civil authorities may
permit religious leaders to solemnize marriages but not to determine who may enter
or leave a civil marriage. Religious leaders may determine independently whether to
recognize a civil marriage or divorce but that recognition or lack thereof has no effect
on the relationship under state law.
704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
70
See generally Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, to Bill Frist, Senate Majority Leader (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d04353r.pdf (updating a 1997 version of the list to include 1138 federal benefits, rights, and
privileges associated with marriage).
71
Memorandum from the Wyo. Legislative Serv. Office Research Staff to the Wyo.
Legislative Serv. Office Attorney (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with author) (listing Wyoming statutes that
mention marriage).
72

191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971).

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48–49 (Haw. 1993). However, a state constitutional
amendment was passed in November 2008 granting power to the legislature to “reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples.” Haw. Const. art. 1, § 23.
73

74

Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
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a bill dubbed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).75 Under DOMA, marriage
is defined for federal purposes as a union between one man and one woman.76
Further, DOMA explicitly permits states to treat same-sex marriages differently
than different-sex marriages.77 Such a provision directly contradicts typical
interpretations of Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.78 This clause states, in part, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Record, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.”79 Typically, the DOMA section allowing states to bypass the traditional
meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as it relates to marriage, has been
implemented through the passage of specific state legislation or constitutional
amendments termed mini-DOMAs. These state statutes (or constitutional
amendments) typically serve two purposes: first, to restrict marriage in that state
to couples of different sexes; and second to permit the state to refuse to recognize
lawful same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions.80 Such a constitutional

75
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996). An
example of the forces organized against same-sex marriage were the proponents of California’s
Proposition 8 recognized by the district court in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Finding the coalition was called

ProtectMarriage.com—Yes on 8, a Project of California Renewal (“Protect Marriage”)
as a “primarily formed ballot measure committee” under California Law. . . . Protect
Marriage is a “broad coalition” of individuals and organizations, including the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the “LDS Church”), the California Catholic
Conference and a large number of evangelical churches.
Id.
76

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). This statute states,
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.

Id.
77

28 U.S.C. § 1738C. This statute states,
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required
to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, or tribe, or a
right or claim arising from such relationship.

Id.
78

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.

79

Id.

For a detailed list of each mini-DOMA statute and amendment passed before 2005, see
Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook
for Judges, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2143, 2166–94 (2005). For subsequent rulings, the website for the
Human Rights Campaign, a gay rights advocacy organization, has links for legal rulings in each
state. Human Rights Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/your_community/index.htm (last visited Nov.
27, 2010).
80
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amendment was passed in Hawaii, thus giving the state legislature the power to
negate the court’s ruling that same-sex marriages were constitutional.81
While Hawaii never granted same-sex couples the ability to marry, five
states and the District of Columbia currently issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples.82 In addition, New York recognizes marriages from other jurisdictions,
and New York state courts now recognize Canadian same-sex marriages for the
purposes of public benefits, inheritance, and divorce.83 In sum, twenty percent
of the United States population is located in states that offer some type of broad
rights and responsibilities to same-sex couples.84
Two recent federal district court decisions, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and
Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, could
challenge the constitutionality of DOMA and the future of same-sex marriage
81

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:1-a (2009) (legalizing same-sex marriage); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (same); Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of
2009, 2009 D.C. Legis. Serv. 18-110 (West) (same); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008) (same); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009) (same);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 973 (Mass. 2003) (same).
82

See Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008) (recognizing a
same-sex marriage and finding it not against the public policy of New York to do so absent legislative prevention).
83

Press Release, Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Unprecedented Series of Gains Coast
to Coast for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People (May 9, 2007), available at http://
www.thetaskforce.org/node/2334/print. See, e.g., California Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act, ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2586 (West) (codified as amended at Cal. Fam.
Code §§ 297–299 (West 2008)) (granting same-sex couples, and heterosexual couples meeting
an age requirement, the “same rights, protections, and benefits, and . . . the same responsibilities,
obligations, and duties under law . . . as are granted to and imposed upon spouses”); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§§ 572C-1 to -7 (2010) (listing the requirements of and granting legal recognition to “significant
personal, emotional, and economic relationships with another individual [that] are prohibited by
such legal restrictions from marrying” but not “the same rights and obligations under the law that
are conferred through marriage”); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 37:1-28 to -36 (West 2008) (recognizing
“civil unions between same-sex couples in order to provide these couples with all the rights and
benefits that married heterosexual couples enjoy”); Oregon Family Fairness Act, ch. 99, 2007 Or.
Laws 607 (creating domestic partnerships in Oregon); Act effective July 22, 2007, ch. 156, 2007
Wash. Legis. Serv. 496 (codified as amended at Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.60.010 to .090 (2010))
(acknowledging domestic partnerships for same-sex couples and those over the age of sixty-two
in order to “provide a legal framework for such mutually supportive relationships”). Of particular
interest is Vermont, which passed An Act Relating to Civil Unions. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72
(codified as amended at Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2010)) (granting same-sex couples
the “same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in a
marriage,” and then passed a gay marriage law in 2009). See also, e.g., O’Darling v. O’Darling,
188 P.3d 137, 139 (Okla. 2008) (implying in dicta that the fact the plaintiff was attempting to
dissolve a same-sex marriage would have been fatal to her action); Chambers v. Ormiston, 935
A.2d 956, 963 (R.I. 2007) (refusing to grant a divorce to a same-sex marriage from Massachusetts
because the legislature did not understand marriage to include same-sex marriage when it wrote the
divorce statute).
84
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generally. The next two sections of this article focus on these two cases and
their implications.

A. Perry v. Schwarzenegger
One of the most recent cases involving conflicts over same-sex marriage and
a state mini-DOMA stems from California.85 In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the
federal constitutionality of Proposition 8, a 2008 ballot initiative that amended
the California Constitution to prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriage
performed on or after November 5, 2008, was challenged.86 On August 4, 2010,
Chief Judge Vaughn Walker ruled Proposition 8 violated the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and ordered same-sex
marriages to resume.87 Later that month, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stayed the judgment pending appeal.88
Judge Walker’s opinion included a discussion of the constitutional standard
of review and an examination of the Fourteenth Amendment claims.89 In
general, Judge Walker concluded California had no rational basis or vested
interest in denying same-sex couples marriage licenses.90 As previously discussed,
claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment must be examined under rational basis review or a higher standard
of review.91 While Judge Walker found Proposition 8 unconstitutional using the
lower rational basis standard, he stated:
Although Proposition 8 fails to possess even a rational basis, the
evidence presented at trial shows that gays and lesbians are the
type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to protect. . . . The
trial record shows that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard
of review to apply to legislative classifications based on sexual
orientation. All classifications based on sexual orientation appear
suspect, as the evidence shows that California would rarely,
if ever, have a reason to categorize individuals based on their
sexual orientation. Here, however, strict scrutiny is unnecessary.
Proposition 8 fails to survive even rational basis review.92

85

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

86

Id. at 928.

87

Id. at 1003–04.

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug.
16, 2010).
88

89

Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 981–1004.

90

Id. at 1003.

91

See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.

92

Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (citations omitted).
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Although the judge did not choose to evaluate the petitioners’ claims using strict
scrutiny demanded by suspect classification, his reasoning and commentary
indicate subsequent cases should use a higher level of review.
In reaching his conclusion, Judge Walker reviewed and rejected each of the
arguments Proposition 8 proponents presented.93 He noted Proposition 8 was
based on traditional notions of opposite-sex marriage and on moral disapproval
of homosexuality, neither of which forms a legal basis for discrimination.94 After
reviewing the history of marriage and concluding that the state had no interest in
maintaining restrictions on an individual’s choice of spouse based on gender, the
court ruled that tradition alone cannot form a rational basis for law. 95
Next, the court rejected the argument that the State must proceed with
caution when implementing social changes.96 Judge Walker decided the evidence
showed—beyond debate—that “allowing same-sex couples to marry had at least
a neutral, if not a positive, effect on the institution of marriage and that samesex couples’ marriages would benefit the state,” thus rejecting the argument that
same-sex marriage would amount to sweeping social change.97
In addition, he found that allowing same-sex couples to marry did not
negatively impact the rights of those opposed to same-sex marriage.98 Here the
proponents argued same-sex marriage would impinge upon their First Amendment
rights of association, and same-sex marriage could affect their children through
exposure to gay and lesbian families in the public schools; for example, if the State
permitted same-sex couples to marry, some would choose to have children who
would then be enrolled in the public schools. Proponents of Proposition 8 did
not want their children exposed to such families. The court summarily rejected
this argument, stating, “Proposition 8 does not affect any First Amendment right
or responsibility of parents to educate their children.”99 Next, the judge evaluated
the claim that the State should prohibit same-sex marriage to promote oppositesex parenting over same-sex parenting.100 Relying on expert testimony, the court
concluded same-sex parenting and opposite-sex parenting are of equal quality.101
In sum, Judge Walker concluded the evidence showed “by every available
metric, opposite-sex couples are not better than their same-sex counterparts;
93

Id. at 930–32.

94

Id.

95

Id. at 998.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 999.

99

Id. at 1000.

100

Id. at 999–1000.

101

Id. at 999.
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instead, as partners, parents and citizens, opposite-sex couples and same-sex
couples are equal. Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause because
it does not treat them equally.”102 Judge Walker characterized the right at issue
in the case as simply “the right to marry.”103 Concluding animus against LGBT
individuals cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny as a legitimate reason to
allow differential and discriminatory treatment, Judge Walker relied on the United
States Supreme Court’s reasoning in two pivotal cases on marriage and sexuality:
Loving v. Virginia and Griswold v. Connecticut.104 The judge commented marriage
“has been historically and remains the right to choose a spouse and, with mutual
consent, join together and form a household.”105 In discussing these precedential
cases, he stated that while “[r]ace and gender restrictions shaped marriage during
eras of race and gender inequality, . . . such restrictions were never part of the
historical core of the institution of marriage.”106
Moreover, Judge Walker concluded that “a private moral view that same-sex
couples are inferior to opposite-sex couples is not a proper basis for legislation.”107
In coming to this conclusion, Judge Walker recalled the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Lawrence:
The arguments surrounding Proposition 8 raise a question
similar to that addressed in Lawrence, when the Court asked
whether a majority of citizens could use the power of the state
to enforce “profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical
and moral principles” through the criminal code. The question
here is whether California voters can enforce those same
principles through regulation of marriage licenses. They cannot.
California’s obligation is to treat its citizens equally, not to
“mandate [its] own moral code.” “[M]oral disapproval, without
any other asserted state interest,” has never been a rational basis
for legislation. Tradition alone cannot support legislation.
Proponents’ purported rationales are nothing more than
post-hoc justifications. While the Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit post-hoc rationales, they must connect to the
classification drawn. Here, the purported state interests fit so

102

Id. at 1002 (citation omitted).

103

See id. at 991.

Id. at 991–92 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
104

105

Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 993.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 1002.
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poorly with Proposition 8 that they are irrational, as explained
above. What is left is evidence that Proposition 8 enacts a moral
view that there is something “wrong” with same-sex couples.108
The opinion included eighty findings of fact, typically not reviewable upon
appeal, including the following:109









Marriage is a civil, nonreligious matter.110
Marriage proffers significant benefits both to the state and
to individuals.111
“Individuals do not generally choose their sexual orientation.”112
The State “has no interest in asking gays and lesbians to change
their sexual orientation or in reducing the number of gays and
lesbians in California.”113
“Marrying a person of the opposite sex is an unrealistic option
for gay and lesbian individuals.”114
There are costs and harms to lesbians and gays, which result
from the denial of marriage to same-sex couples.115
Gays and lesbians have a long history of being victims
of discrimination.116

Not surprisingly, Judge Walker concluded that restrictions based on sexual
orientation today could no longer be part of the institution of marriage.117

B. Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health &
Human Services
The Walker court’s ruling against Proposition 8 came on the heels of another
federal court decision, Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health &
108

Id. (citations omitted).

An appellate court can only set aside a finding of fact made by a trial judge if it determines
that the finding is clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(d).
109

110

Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 956.

111

Id. at 961–64.

112

Id. at 966.

113

Id. at 967.

114

Id. at 969–70.

115

Id. at 977–80, 986–87.

116

Id. at 981.

Id. at 993. The Court also held California’s domestic partnership laws do not satisfy
California’s obligation to provide gays and lesbians with the right to marry for two reasons:
(1) domestic partnerships “do not provide the same social meaning as marriage,” and (2) “domestic
partnerships were created specifically so that California could offer same-sex couples rights and
benefits while explicitly withholding marriage from same-sex couples.” Id. at 994.
117
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Human Services.118 In this decision, Judge Joseph L. Tauro ruled the federal
DOMA was unconstitutional because it denied federal rights and benefits to
lawfully married Massachusetts couples thereby offending the notion of states’
rights, as enshrined in the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.119
“The case began . . . when Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders filed a suit
against the . . . [federal] Office of Personnel Management on behalf of eight
married couples and three surviving spouses from Massachusetts [who were]
denied federal spousal rights and benefits because of DOMA . . . .”120 That case
was combined with another, in which Massachusetts sued the federal government
for mandating it to treat some of its married citizens differently from others when
operating federally funded programs such as Medicaid and veterans’ cemeteries.121
Judge Tauro ruled DOMA violated the United States Constitution “by intruding
on areas of exclusive state authority, as well as the Spending Clause, by forcing
the Commonwealth to engage in invidious discrimination against its own citizens
in order to receive and retain federal funds in connection with two joint federalstate programs.”122 No decision has been reached yet on whether the Obama
Administration’s Justice Department will appeal the decision.123
Combined, these two lower-level federal decisions significantly challenge
the existence of both federal and state DOMAs. Ultimately, the decisions also
challenge the prohibitions on same-sex marriage existing in most jurisdictions
and establish precedent for other states to follow.

118

698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).

119

Id. at 253.

Jake Tapper, Judge Rules Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional; Will President Obama’s
Justice Department Appeal?, Political Punch: Power, pop, & probings from ABC News Senior
White House Correspondent Jake Tapper (July 8, 2010, 10:08 PM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/
politicalpunch/2010/07/judge-rules-defense-of-marriage-act-is-unconstitutional-will-presidentobamas-justice-department-app.html.
120

Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). This case explored
areas of administrative concern to Massachusetts: the operation of veterans’ cemeteries, the impact
on MassHealth, and Medicare tax. Of particular concern to the State was a June 2008 directive from
the National Cemetery Administration, an arm of the Veteran’s Administration, stating “individuals
in a same-sex civil union or marriage are not eligible for burial in a national cemetery or State
veterans cemetery that receives federal grant funding based on being the spouse or surviving spouse
of a same-sex veteran.” Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (quoting William Walls Aff.; Ex. 2;
nat’l Cemetery Admin., Directive 3210/1 (June 4, 2008)).
121

122

Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 236.

Tapper, supra note 120. According to Tapper, “A Justice Department spokesperson said
that [the] Obama administration was ‘reviewing the decision,’ and had not yet decided whether to
appeal to defend a law against same sex marriage that President Obama says he opposes.” Id.
123
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C. Wyoming and Same-Sex Marriage
Two Wyoming statutes specifically address marriage.124 First, Wyoming
Statute section 20-1-101 states, “Marriage is a civil contract between a male
and a female person to which the consent of the parties capable of contracting
is essential.” Second, Wyoming Statute section 20-1-111 states: “All marriage
contracts which are valid by the laws of the country in which contracted are valid
in this state.” Thus, unless these statutes are found unconstitutional, Wyoming has
explicit statutory language that marriage must include opposite-sex partners and
a statement about full faith and credit regarding marriages performed elsewhere.
Section 20-1-101 would need modification before same-sex marriages could
be performed in the state in accordance with Wyoming law. However, section
20-1-111 does not specifically address the state’s stance on marriages between
same-sex couples performed in other jurisdictions.
Certainly the arguments in favor of Wyoming’s recognition of same-sex
marriages performed in other jurisdictions are straightforward under section
20-1-111: Any valid marriage in State X is considered a valid marriage in Wyoming.
Consequently, a valid same-sex marriage in State X should be considered a valid
marriage in Wyoming. Those opposing such recognition argue, however, that
the logical implication of section 20-1-101 is state public policy requires a valid
marriage to be between a man and a woman. This latter argument leads to a
discussion of what constitutes an acceptable interpretation of unarticulated public
policy; that is, what is public policy as it relates to the lack of explicit constitutional
or statutory language in the state’s marriage laws? Persuasive precedent exists on
this question.
While common-law marriages are not valid in Wyoming, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has recognized common-law marriages from other states in the
context of survivor death benefits. In Bowers v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel.
Workmen’s Compensation Division, the court stated: “[N]o legitimate state interest
is served by discrimination between [illegitimate and legitimate] children[;] it
appears equally certain that no such interest is served by discrimination between
legally married spouses.”125 The court concluded that “[a]s has been the law of this
state since 1876, marriages outside the state which are valid therein are valid in
this state.”126
A corollary exists between the Bowers court reasoning on common-law
marriage and recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other states.
Preceding the Bowers ruling, the Wyoming Supreme Court in In re Roberts’

124

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-1-101, -111 (2010).

125

593 P.2d 182, 184 (Wyo. 1979).

126

Id. at 184 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-111 (1977)).
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Estate declared common-law marriages were not valid and violated the state’s
marriage code.127 While no such ruling on same-sex marriages has occurred in
the state, it would follow that although same-sex marriages may be considered
against Wyoming public policy, such an interpretation does not necessarily mean
recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other states is against Wyoming
public policy. However, Wyoming law is not clear on this point.
This lack of clarity concerns those opposed to same-sex marriages and the
recognition of same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions.128 It also has resulted
in unsuccessful attempts to clarify the law through passage of a mini-DOMA.
Wyoming is one of a handful of states that does not grant same-sex marriage
or have a mini-DOMA law.129 While such bills have been introduced in several
legislative sessions, none have passed. The last of these bills was introduced in
the 2009 legislative session.130 Wyoming House Joint Resolution 17 would have
called for a statewide vote on a constitutional amendment providing that “a
marriage between a man and a woman shall be the only legal union that shall be
valid or recognized in this state.”131 The resolution was soundly defeated by a vote
of twenty-five in favor to thirty-five opposed.132
While the sponsors and speakers in favor of the resolution argued against
gay marriage generally, they also argued that the ambiguity in state law regarding
same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions should be resolved against
recognition before the courts were asked to make a determination.133 However,
127

In re Roberts’ Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 503 (Wyo. 1943); see Bowers, 593 P.2d 182.

As this article is under review, Wyoming Attorney General Bruce Salzburg signed onto
an amicus curiae brief with twelve other states in support of the reversal of the district court
holding in Perry. Brief for States of Indiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2010), 2010 WL 4075743. The signatories
argue five points against gay marriage: (1) “states have sovereign primacy over marriage,” id. at 2–5;
(2) “Baker v. Nelson compels reversal,” id. at 6–7; (3) there is no fundamental right to same-sex
marriage nor are suspect classes implicated, id. at 8–12; (4) “the concept of traditional marriage . . .
satisfies rational basis review,” id. at 12–29; and (5) that “the district court’s new definition of
marriage contains no principle limiting the types of relationship that can make claims on the state,”
id. at 29–36.
128

Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, State Laws Prohibiting Recognition of Same-Sex
Relationships 1 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/
issue_maps/samesex_relationships_7_09.pdf.
129

Defense of Marriage, H.R.J. Res. 17, 60th Leg., 2009 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2009), available at
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2009/Introduced/HJ0017.pdf.
130

131

Id.

Roll Call, H.R. 60-0017, 60th Leg., 2009 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2009), available at http://
legisweb.state.wy.us/2009/Digest/HJ0017.htm. Ultimately, the measure would have needed fortyone votes out of sixty in the House of Representatives to pass from the House to the Senate. In the
Senate, it would have needed twenty-one out of thirty votes. Finally, it would have required the
Governor’s signature before becoming a ballot measure.
132

Audio: House Floor Debate, Wyoming Legislature (Feb. 6, 2009, AM), http://legisweb.
state.wy.us/2009/audio/house/h0206am1.mp3.
133
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opponents of the resolution prevailed.134 The opponents argued from a variety
of viewpoints. One called the resolution “state sponsored bigotry.”135 Others
maintained the issue had the potential to engage the state in a fight that would pit
neighbor against neighbor to the detriment of all, and in times of economic crisis,
the legislature and state’s eyes should be on assuring economic security.136 Finally,
other arguments invoked the state’s motto, the “Equality State,” with a reading of
portions of the Wyoming Constitution including:
Sec. 2. Equality of all. In their inherent right to life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race
are equal.
Sec. 3. Equal political rights. Since equality in the enjoyment
of natural and civil rights is only made sure through political
equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights and
privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race,
color, sex, or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other
than individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained
by a court of competent jurisdiction.137
Speakers citing these provisions asserted their beliefs that Wyoming’s LGBT
citizens must be treated equally.
As the legislature has failed to act, it may be up to the courts to interpret
the federal and state constitutions as they relate to Wyoming’s LGBT citizens
and their claims for equal treatment.138 Some of these citizens would like to
134

Roll Call, supra note 132.

Jared Miller, Gay Marriage Ban Falls in House, Casper Star Trib., Feb. 7, 2009, http://trib.
com/news/state-and-regional/article_20db2a5b-5d02-562a-8369-16663af0d5d9.html.
135

136

Id.

137

Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 3.

On August 13, 2010, Gerald Shupe-Roderick and Ryan Dupree filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, which was withdrawn a month later.
Complaint, Shupe-Roderick v. Freudenthal, No. 2:10-cv-00166-ABJ (D. Wyo. Aug. 13, 2010). In
their complaint the plaintiffs, both of Cheyenne, alleged sections 20-1-101 to -113 of the Wyoming
Statutes were unconstitutional under the “laws that are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 2. As a remedy, the complaint requested that the court
“enjoin, preliminarily and permanently, all enforcement of Wyoming Statute § 20-1-101 and any
other Wyoming statutes, ordinances or laws that seek to exclude gays and lesbians from access to
civil marriage.” Id. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued “[m]arriage is a supremely important
social institution. . . .” Id. at 7. Furthermore, they argued that the
138

“freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Each day that Plaintiffs are denied the freedom to marry, they
suffer irreparable harm as a direct result of Defendant’s violation of their constitutional rights.
Id.; see Jeremy Pelzer, Gay Couple Drops Lawsuit, Casper Star Trib., Sept. 16, 2010, at 1.
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marry their same-sex partner in Wyoming and some have married legally in other
jurisdictions and would like the same federal and state benefits that are associated
with marriage. In addition, many would like to enjoy the societal recognition that
the institution of marriage confers generally that is now denied to them.

D. Same-Sex Families with Children and Other Reproductive Issues
Recognition of same-sex relationships is also relevant in terms of same-sex
individuals and families with children. Adoption and foster-parenting policies vary
from state to state.139 Some state policies explicitly permit gay and lesbian parents
or couples to adopt children or become foster parents; others ban all “unmarried
couples” from adoption.140 While Mississippi bans adoptions by two people of the
same sex, prior to a 2010 case, Florida was the only state that prohibited a single
lesbian or gay person from adopting children in need of a home.141
Wyoming law permits any adult person who has resided in the state for sixty
days to adopt.142 The law is silent on LGBT couples jointly adopting a child and
on LGBT individuals adopting a child of their same-sex partner (a situation often
referred to as a second-parent adoption).143 Two reproductive methods that LGBT
families utilize for family formation are surrogacy and donor insemination. No
state statutory provisions or case law exist on surrogacy; consequently it is not
clear how Wyoming will treat a surrogacy agreement involving LGBT individuals.
While both heterosexual and LGBT individuals may make use of donor sperm,
the Wyoming Donor Insemination Law states a donor is not a legal parent of a

139

See infra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.

California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Vermont permit adoptions by those
who are not married. Cal. Fam. Code § 9000 (West 2009); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-724(a)(3)
(2010); D.C. Code § 16-302 (2010); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2010). Mississippi and
Utah expressly prohibit adoptions by couples who are unmarried. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3(5)
(2010) (prohibiting couples of the same gender from adopting); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-117(3)
(West 2010) (prohibiting adoption “by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a
legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state”). See generally Parenting, Hum. Rts.
Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/issues/parenting/parenting_laws.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2010)
(providing a state by state summary of adoption laws).
140

Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3(5); Fla. Stat. § 63.042(3) (2010). But see, Fla. Dep’t of
Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (granting
a petition for adoption was proper because Florida Statute section 63.042(3), which prohibited a
homosexual person from adopting, was unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection under the
Florida Constitution Article I, Section 2).
141

142

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-103 (2010).

See generally Elizabeth A. Delaney, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally
Recognizing the Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and her Child, 43 Hastings
L.J. 177 (1991) (discussing second-parent adoptions); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Non-Traditional Families, 78 Geo. L.J. 459 (1990).
143
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child conceived via assisted reproduction, and only a man who provides semen for
assisted reproduction with the intention of being a parent of the child is, in fact,
the parent.144
Furthermore, Wyoming law allows a partner to make medical decisions for
an incapacitated same-sex partner as someone who “has exhibited special care and
concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, and
who is reasonably available may act as a surrogate.”145 However, a spouse, adult
child, parent, adult sibling, grandparent, or grandchild all could have priority
ahead of the same-sex partner. In order to have the partner move ahead of these
others, adults may designate that same-sex partners have the authority to make
medical decisions on their behalf through a power of attorney.146

E. Hertzler v. Hertzler
The only Wyoming Supreme Court case to address the relevance of samesex sexuality under state laws is a child custody dispute.147 As such, it deserves
careful review. Dean and Pamela Hertzler divorced shortly after they adopted
their second child.148 The mother agreed to disavow lesbianism and became the
custodial parent.149 When the mother entered into an open and ongoing lesbian
relationship with Peggy, she transferred primary custody of the children to the
father and was granted liberal visitation rights.150 Soon thereafter, Dean Hertzler
remarried a woman, Christine, who had strict religious views condemning
homosexuality.151 The children’s father then sought a modification of the custody
order to greatly restrict the mother’s visitation rights.152
In ruling for the father, the district court held that it was likely that the
children would be negatively impacted because of societal disapproval of
their mother’s homosexuality, and that the state had an interest in supporting
conventional marriages and families.153 The court reduced the visitation rights of
the children’s mother based on its belief that the children would be confused by

144

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-902 to -903.

145

Id. § 35-22-406(c).

146

Id. § 35-22-403(b).

147

Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).

148

Id. at 948.

149

Id.

150

Id. at 948–49.

151

Id. at 949.

152

Id.

153

See id. at 950.
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their mother’s sexuality and that their moral development would be negatively
impacted.154 Pamela Hertzler appealed the district court’s ruling to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.155
In a three-to-two ruling, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court, ruling the lower court did not abuse its discretion.156 However, the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the trial court’s negative commentary on the mother’s
sexuality.157 In particular, the court found bias in the lower court’s acceptance of
the father’s expert witness and rejection of the mother’s.158 Further, in its review
of the father’s allegation that the mother’s lesbianism was a significant change of
circumstance dictating the need for a revised visitation order, the court rejected
the district court’s commentary on homosexuality and gay and lesbian families.159
The court stated,
[W]e must address a fundamental flaw in the analysis articulated
by the district court in its decision letter: “The state has an
interest in perpetuating the values associated with conventional
marriage, as the family is the basic cornerstone of our society.
Homosexuality is inherently inconsistent with families, and
with the relationship and values which perpetuate families.”
The position of the family as the cornerstone of our society is a
proper subject of judicial notice. We are not, however, inclined
towards exclusion in defining the family unit, particularly where
the care and nurturing of children is at issue.160
Further, the Supreme Court commented, “[T]he district court indulged an
essentially personal viewpoint in derogation of Pamela’s lifestyle.”161
Regardless of this analysis disparaging the district court’s negative dicta on the
mother’s lesbianism, the Wyoming Supreme Court found the trial court did not
abuse its discretion to the point of failing to rule in the children’s best interests. It

154

See id. at 952.

155

Id. at 949.

156

Id. at 952.

157

Id. at 951–52.

Id. at 950. The lower court allowed the expert witness for the father, a former minister
with a recent Master’s degree in counseling who admitted to a deep-seated anti-gay bias, while
rejecting the mother’s experts which included an experienced psychologist with a Ph.D. and years of
experience. Id.
158

159

Id. at 951–52.

160

Id. (citations omitted).

161

Id. at 951.
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upheld the district court’s ruling in favor of the father’s motion.162 The Supreme
Court closed with the following salvo:
The district court’s judgment is not affirmed because of Dean
and Christine’s insistence upon their “values” so much as it is
in spite of that behavior. The damage their contest with Pamela
has done to these children may already be irreparable. If Dean,
Christine, and Pamela cannot fully subordinate promotion of
their respective lifestyles to the natural innocence and love of
their children for both parents, they will quickly extinguish
whatever remaining chances these children have for happy and
productive lives. With that somber caveat, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.163
The dissent in the case reiterated the majority’s condemnation of the district
court ruling for custody based on its personal condemnation of the mother’s
lesbianism and found such animus rose to the level of abuse of discretion.164
Moreover, the dissent disagreed with the majority that both the father and mother
engaged the children equally in detrimental lifestyle clashes, instead finding that
“the father and Christine worked long and hard at alienating these children
from their mother. They should have been held in contempt for what they have
done.”165 The dissent concluded by citing the testimony of Dr. Moriarity, a licensed
psychologist, who concluded the children would be impacted detrimentally by a
ruling limiting the mother’s visitation and that the mother and her partner were
loving, caring parents whose relationship with the children should be encouraged
rather than curtailed.166
In sum, while a deeply divided court deferred to a lower court’s decision,
the court unanimously disagreed with that lower court’s negative determinations
about same-sex sexuality and families.167 With no other reported rulings on gay
and lesbian families with children, Wyoming is one of the few states in which
the status of same-sex families with children remains murky. While the polar star
for all determinations of child custody is the “best interests of the children,” the
Hertzler ruling implies future litigants may not argue a parent’s homosexuality is
a per-se negative factor in determining custody or visitation.

Id. at 952. However, in so ruling the appellate court also commented favorably on the trial
court’s easing its restriction of Pamela’s visitation rights “[s]ince its initial decision, the district court
has wisely eased restrictions on Pamela’s visitation rights.” Id.
162

163

Id.

164

Id. at 953 (Golden, C.J., dissenting).

165

Id. at 954.

166

Id. at 954–56.

167

Id. at 950–51 (majority opinion), 953 (Golden, C.J., dissenting).
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IV. Employment Issues
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) protects individuals from
being fired, harassed, or denied a promotion or a raise based on race, religion, sex,
or national origin.168 The Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits
age discrimination, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits
discrimination based on disability.169 Under these laws, aggrieved parties, both
individuals and groups, may bring causes of action under theories of disparate
treatment and/or disparate impact.170 Remedies vary, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 modified them to include punitive damages for findings of intentional
discrimination.171 Title VII explicitly forbids the use of quotas or preferential
treatment to listed-group members as a remedy or as a business practice to assure
that equal opportunities exist.172 The law prohibits public and private employers,
employment agencies, and labor unions from basing employment decisions on any
of the protected categories.173 It exempts small businesses, religious organizations,
and the military.174
Currently, no federal law specifically protects LGBT individuals from
employment discrimination, and the reach of Title VII does not include protections
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.175 According to studies by the
American Psychological Association and the Williams Institute of University
of California, Los Angeles School of Law, such protections are necessary for at
least two distinct reasons. First, to protect LGBT individuals from irrational

168

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634; Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117; see 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (forbidding
employment discrimination against anyone over the age of forty years in the United States).
169

For an overview of Title VII, see Tenth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law:
Employment Law Chapter: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 10 Geo. J. Gender & L. 639
(Laura C. Bornstein ed. 2009). In a disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must establish that because
of membership in a listed category, she or he was treated differently than others. Although a disparate
treatment claim requires a showing that the employer acted intentionally, the intent need not be
malicious in order for a plaintiff to meet his or her burden. Id. at 646–47. In a disparate impact
case, a plaintiff must show how an employer’s policies negatively impacted his or her protected class;
i.e., that facially neutral employment practices resulted in a significant pattern of discrimination. Id.
at 665.
170

171

42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

172

Id. § 2000e-2(j).

173

Id. § 2000e-2(a)–(d).

174

Id. § 2000e-2(e)–(i).

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding Title VII applies
when both parties are of the same sex). However, lower courts are split about whether this ruling
applies to anti-gay animus. See Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale:
Meeting the “Because of . . . Sex” Requirement, 22 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 42, 76–92 (2007)
(providing an excellent overview of all post-Oncale rulings).
175
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discrimination, and second, the protections are simply good business practices.176
Data recorded by the Human Rights Campaign, a gay-rights organization,
indicate that “[a]s of September 2009, 434 (87%) of the Fortune 500 companies
had implemented non-discrimination polices that include sexual orientation, and
207 (41%) had policies that include gender identity.”177
For several years, Congress has debated a version of a bill called the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).178 This act, like the ADA and
the ADEA, would extend anti-employment-discrimination provisions to include
sexual orientation or gender identity.179 Like Title VII, if the current version of
ENDA were to become law, it would explicitly prohibit preferential treatment
and quotas based on sexual orientation or gender identity; however, it would
exempt small businesses, religious organizations, and the military.180 The act
only allows disparate treatment suits and not disparate impact claims, and thus
plaintiffs could not argue that an employer’s facially neutral policy has a disparate
impact on individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.181
While Wyoming has no law covering sexual orientation or gender
identity, numerous states have passed laws to protect LGBT individuals from
discrimination.182 Currently, more than half the United States population lives in

176
Examining the Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA): The Scientists Perspective, Am.
Psychol. Ass’n, http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/employment-nondiscrimination.aspx (last
visited Nov. 27, 2010); see also William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An Empirical
Assessment, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 65 (2001).

These figures represent eighty-seven and forty-one percent of the companies, respectively.
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, Hum. Rts. Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/laws_and_elections/
enda.asp (last updated Feb. 26, 2010).
177

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-1584; Employment Non-Discrimination
Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.
xpd?bill=h111-3017. Representatives Barney Frank (D-MA) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), and
Senators Jeff Merkley (D-OR) and Susan Collins (R-ME) introduced the most recent bills in the
111th Congress. Hearings took place in both houses, but the bill has again not come forward for
full debate. See also Brad Sears, Christy Mallory & Nan D. Hunter, Williams Inst., Congressional
Record of Employment Discrimination Against LGBT Public Employees. 1994–2007, in Documenting
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in State Employment
9-1 (2009), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/8vv8v8gk (providing a history of ENDA).
178

179

S. 1584 § 2; H.R. 3017 § 2.

180

S. 1584 §§ 4(f ), 3(a)(4)(A), 6, 7; H.R. 3017 §§ 4(f ), 3(a)(4)(A), 6, 7.

181

S. 1584 § 4(g); H.R. 3017 § 4(g).

See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-81c (2010); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 368-1 (2010);
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1) (2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12 (West 2010); Wis. Stat.
§ 111.36 (2010).
182
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jurisdictions that outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation.183 However,
Wyoming is among the twenty-nine states allowing discrimination based on
sexual orientation and the thirty-eight states allowing discrimination based on
gender identity or expressions.184 During the 2010 Wyoming legislative session,
Wyoming House Bill 087, Discrimination, was introduced with bi-partisan
co-sponsorship.185 If it had passed, the bill would have modified Wyoming statutes
with anti-discrimination language to include “sexual orientation and gender
identity.”186 House Bill 087 would have updated Wyoming’s fair employment
law, as well as anti-discrimination provisions in other laws such as jury
selection and public accommodations.187 Re-introduction is expected in future
legislative sessions.

183
Matt Foreman, Unprecedented Series of Gains Coast to Coast for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender People, Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force (May 9, 2007), http://www.thetaskforce.org/
node/2334/print. Wisconsin was the first state to ban employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation in 1982. Wis. Stat. §§ 36.12, 106.50, 106.52, 111.31, 230.18, 224.77. Minnesota
was the first state to ban employment discrimination based on both sexual orientation and gender
identity when it passed the Human Rights Act in 1993. Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01 to .41 (2010).

Currently, twelve states and the District of Columbia have policies that protect against both
sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in employment. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12920
(Deering 2010); Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (Deering 2010); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-34-401 to -402
(2010); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-102 (2010); Iowa Code § 216.2 (2010); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5,
§§ 4571–4576 (2010); Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01 to .41; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:2-1, :5-1 to -49;
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7 (2010); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.004 (2010); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-3,
-7, 34-37-4, -4.3, 11-24-2 (2010); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495 (2010); id. tit. 9, § 4503; id. tit. 8,
§§ 4724, 10403; id. tit. 3, § 963; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49.60.130-175 to -176, -178, -180, -190,
-200, -215, -222 to -225, -300 (2010); Wash. Admin. Code § 356-09-020 (2010); Wash. Exec.
Order No. 85-09 (1985) (protecting public employees from sexual orientation discrimination).
An additional nine states have laws protecting against discrimination based on sexual
orientation only. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a–81c; Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, §§ 710, 711, 719 (2010);
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 515-2 to -7, 378-1 to -3, 489-2 to -3; Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606
(West 2010); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 233.010(2), 613.330 (2010); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-I:42, 354-A:2, :6 (2010); N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296, 296-a (McKinney 2010);
Wis. Stat. §§ 36.12, 106.50, .52, 111.31, 230.18, 224.70.
184
The following states have no explicit anti-discrimination language regarding sexual
orientation and gender identity: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The following states have language regarding
sexual orientation but not gender identity: Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin. See State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S.,
Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force (July 1, 2009), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/
issue_maps/non_discrimination_7_09_color.pdf (providing updates to state nondiscrimination
laws); supra note 176.

H.B. 87, 60th Leg., 2010 Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2010), available at http://legisweb.state.
wy.us/2010/Introduced/HB0087.pdf. The bill passed the House Judiciary Committee, but it was
not heard for full debate on the House floor before the cut-off date.
185

186

Id.

187

Id.
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Without explicit protection in the Wyoming statutes, it is not surprising
no reported cases of anti-gay employment discrimination by private employers
exist. Currently, such animus is not forbidden by law. There have been two
documented cases of employment discrimination by government employers,
both of which found against the LGBT plaintiffs.188 In Milligan-Hitt v. Board of
Trustees of Sheridan County School District No. 2, two lesbian school administrators
from Sheridan County successfully sued the Sheridan County School District
and superintendent.189 Following a trial on the merits, the jury awarded the two
plaintiffs $160,515 for employment discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.190 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
decision based on its interpretation that the superintendent was not the final
policymaker for the District and could not be liable for his actions.191 Citing the
currency at the time of Bowers v. Hardwick, the court also declared the status
of the law regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation was not clearly
unconstitutional, and therefore qualified immunity protected the superintendent
from personal liability.192
In Brockman v. Wyoming Department of Family Services, a state employee
alleged gender discrimination based on comments made by a supervisor about the
employee’s perceived lesbianism.193 Ms. Brockman argued, first, that her supervisor
incorrectly believed that she was lesbian and then subjected her to a hostile
work environment, and second, that she was discriminated against for failing to
meet the personal characteristics that her supervisor believed to be appropriate
for a woman. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants
holding that,
“[s]exual orientation is conspicuously and intentionally absent
from the list of protected categories under Title VII,” and that
“[r]ecasting allegations of homophobia as ‘sex stereotyping’ does
not of itself bring the action under the purview of the Civil
Rights Act.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, and the
U.S. Supreme Court denied the employee’s writ of certiorari.194

188
Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir.
2008); Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., No. 00-cv-0087-B (D. Wyo. May 9, 2001).
189

Milligan-Hitt, 523 F.3d at 1221.

190

Id. at 1223.

191

Id. at 1221.

192

Id. at 1233.

Brockman, No. 00-cv-0087-B (D. Wyo. May 9, 2001). Ms. Brockman denied the
allegations. Id.
193

194

See Williams Inst., supra note 10, at 6.
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While these cases indicate there has been little recourse in the courts for those
alleging employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity, the University of Wyoming (UW), a publicly funded state university has
an equal employment opportunity clause which states:
The University’s policy has been, and will continue to be, one of
nondiscrimination, offering equal opportunity to all employees
and applicants for employment on the basis of their demonstrated
ability and competence without regard to such matters as race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, veteran status,
sexual orientation or political belief.195
The UW College of Law further prohibits “[a]ny employer that discriminates for
the purposes of hiring on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, marital status, age or disability” from using the facilities and
services of the law school’s Career Services Office.196
Finally, the UW Board of Trustees passed a resolution permitting the
University President to implement domestic partner benefits for same-sex and
different-sex employees when he deems it to be fiscally viable.197 However, there
has been no official domestic policy implemented at UW.

V. The Murder of Matthew Shepard:
Hate Crime Legislation and the Gay Panic Defense
In the fall of 1998, Matthew Shepard, a twenty-one-year-old UW student
and Casper native, was bludgeoned to near death with the butt end of a pistol

University of Wyoming, Laramie, Univ. Reg. 3, Rev. 2 (June 17, 2007), available at http://
www.uwyo.edu/generalcounselsupport/clean%20uw%20regulations/UW%20Reg%201-3.pdf.
195

Career Servs. Office, Equal Opportunity Statement/Non Discrimination Policy, U. of Wyo.
C. of L. (2007), available at http://www.uwyo.edu/lawcsosupport/docs/EqualEmploymentOppor
tunityStatement.pdf. This policy was suspended with respect to the military in response to the
Solomon Amendment, which allows the Secretary of Defense to deny federal grants to institutions
of higher education if they prohibit or prevent military recruitment on campus. Id.
196

197
The University of Wyoming Board of Trustees’ Minutes (May 29–31, 2009), http://www.
uwyo.edu/trusteessupport/Meetings/2009/May/2009_May%2029-31_BOT%20Business%20
Meeting%20_Retreat__FINAL.pdf. Trustee Davis stated the following motion regarding domestic
partner benefits:

I move that the Board of Trustees approve, as a matter of principle, a policy that
would allow the university administration to implement a voucher system to provide
domestic partner benefits, with the understanding that implementation of such a
system shall not occur now but must wait until such time as the President of the
University determines that it is fiscally viable in light of the current budget reductions.
Id. at 3.
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and lashed to a fence on the outskirts of town.198 Shepard, discovered by a passing
cyclist eighteen hours after being abandoned by his attackers, regrettably died
five days later from the massive injuries he sustained from the attack. Soon after,
Matthew Shepard became the face of hate crimes against LGBT individuals.
Two Laramie residents, Russell Henderson and Aaron McKinney,
committed the crime.199 While Russell Henderson pled guilty to felony murder
and kidnapping, the case against Aaron McKinney went to trial. McKinney’s
trial brought forth the “gay panic” defense, alleging past negative homosexual
experiences caused McKinney to react violently to Shepard’s alleged advances.200
Judge Barton R. Voigt ruled the defense inadmissible.201 This section addresses
both the issue of hate crimes and the gay panic defense.

A. Hate Crimes
Statutes against crimes motivated by animus toward a protected class are
called hate crime or bias crime laws. Until the inclusion of sexual orientation and
gender identity in 2009, protected classes under federal anti-hate crime legislation
included those delineated by race, color, religion, or national origin.202 In general,
hate crime acts have one or more of the following purposes: (1) to define specific
bias-motivated acts as distinct crimes; (2) to increase penalties for bias-motivated
criminal acts; (3) to create a distinct civil cause of action for hate crimes; and/or
(4) to require administrative agencies to collect hate crime statistics.203
Harsher punishments for hate crimes are often justified based on the idea
that hate crimes result in greater individual and societal harm. While enacting the
Hate Crimes Act of 2000, the New York State Legislature found the following:

198
See Beth Loffreda, Losing Matt Shepard: Life and Politics in the Aftermath of AntiGay Murder (2000).
199

State v. McKinney, Crim. Action No. 6381 (2d Jud. Dist. Ct., Albany Cnty., Wyo. 1999).

200

See infra Part V.B.

201

See infra notes 220–31 and accompanying text.

202

18 U.S.C. § 245 (2006).

See generally Jana C. Romaine, Hate Crimes, 4 Geo. J. Gender & L. 115 (2002). For
examples of defining acts, see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 422.7 (West 2010); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 46a-58 (2010); Iowa Code § 729A.2 (2010). For enhancing penalties, see, e.g., Alaska
Stat. § 12.55.155 (2010); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-702 (2010); Cal. Penal Code § 422.7.
For establishing a civil cause of action, see, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51.7, 52.1; D.C. Code
§ 22-3704 (2010); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-7.1 (2010); Iowa Code § 729A.5; Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.147b (2010). For data collection statutes, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1750; Iowa Code
§ 692.15; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 22, § 33 (2010); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-114 (2010); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:53A-21 (West 2010). See State Hate Crimes Statutory Provisions, Anti-Defamation League,
http://www.adl.org/learn/hate_crimes_laws/map_frameset.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
203
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Hate crimes do more than threaten the safety and welfare of
all citizens. They inflict on victims incalculable physical and
emotional damage and tear at the very fabric of free society.
Crimes motivated by invidious hatred toward particular groups
not only harm individual victims but send a powerful message
of intolerance and discrimination to all members of the group to
which the victim belongs. Hate crimes can and do intimidate and
disrupt entire communities and vitiate the civility that is essential
to healthy democratic processes. In a democratic society, citizens
cannot be required to approve of the beliefs and practices of
others, but must never commit criminal acts on account of them.
Current law does not adequately recognize the harm to public
order and individual safety that hate crimes cause. Therefore,
our laws must be strengthened to provide clear recognition of
the gravity of hate crimes and the compelling importance of
preventing their recurrence. Accordingly, the legislature finds
and declares that hate crimes should be prosecuted and punished
with appropriate severity.204
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that statutes with enhanced penalties
for hate crimes do not conflict with free speech rights and do not punish an
individual for exercising freedom of expression.205 Rather, they allow courts
to consider the motives of criminals for conduct that is not protected by the
First Amendment.206
In 2009, Congress passed an expansion of the federal hate crimes law, which
has been called the Shepard/Byrd Act (Act).207 The Act expands the 1969 federal
anti-crime law and expressly grants the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
authority to investigate violent hate crimes when “the crime was committed
because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability, of any person, and the crime affected
See N.Y. Penal Law § 485.00 (McKinney 2002) (finding that biased and prejudicial
“criminal acts involving violence, intimidation, and destruction of property” have recently become
more widespread throughout the state of New York).
204

205

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993).

206

Id. at 489.

See Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
111–84, §§ 4701–4713, 123 Stat. 2835–44 (2009). The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.
Hate Crimes Prevention Act, also known as the Matthew Shepard Act, was passed on October
22, 2009, and signed into law by President Barack Obama on October 28, 2009, as a rider to the
National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 (H.R. 2647). This bill was vigorously supported by
the family of Matthew Shepard and the foundation it founded to address hate crimes. Among the
foundation’s goals are to increase knowledge and understanding regarding LGBT individuals and to
address the negative impact of anti-LGBT discrimination. See Matthew Shepard Found., http://
www.matthewshepard.org (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
207
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interstate or foreign commerce, or occurred on federal property.”208 The Act gives
federal authorities greater ability to engage in hate crime investigations that local
authorities choose not to pursue.209 Further, it provides $5 million in annual
funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to help state and local agencies pay for
investigating and prosecuting hate crimes.210 Additionally, it requires the FBI to
track statistics on hate crimes against transgender people.211 Statistics for the other
above-listed groups are already tracked.212
On the state level, the Shepard/Byrd Act allows local Wyoming law
enforcement agencies to receive assistance from the federal government in the
wake of increased costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of a
hate crime.213 Such a provision would have helped enormously in Albany County,
Wyoming, where the murder of Matthew Shepard and subsequent trial of Aaron
McKinney occurred. According to one report, the costs associated with the
Matthew Shepard murder exceeded $150,000 for local agencies and caused the
Albany County sheriff ’s department to furlough five deputies.214
Ironically, Wyoming is one of only five states without hate crime laws.215
While legislators have introduced several bills in the Wyoming legislature to

208

Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, §§ 4701–4713.

209

Id. § 4706.

210

Id. § 4704(b)(7).

211

Id. § 4708.

212

Id.

213

Id. § 4704.

See Michael Janofsky, Public Lives; Gay Man’s Death Led to Epiphany for Wyoming Officer,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2000.
214

215
The others are Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan, and South Carolina. There are twelve states
and the District of Columbia with hate crime laws that include crimes based on sexual orientation
and gender identity. E.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 422.75, .76 (West 2009); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-9-121 (2010); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-181j to -181l (2010); D.C. Code §§ 22-3701 to
-3702, -3704, 2-1401.02 (2010); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 846-51 to -52, -54, 706-662 (2010); Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Law §§ 10-301 to -306 (2010); Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.03(44), 609.2231(4)
(definition of sexual orientation), .595(1a), .748, 611A.79 (2009); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 557.035
(2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:16-1 (West 2010); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.155, .165, 181.550 (2010).

Eighteen states have passed hate crime laws that include crimes based on sexual orientation.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1750, 13-701(D)(15) (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit 11, § 1304 (2010);
Fla. Stat. § 775.085 (2010); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-7.1 (2010); Iowa Code § 729A.1-2 (2010);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4716 (2009); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.031 (West 2010); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 14:107.2, 15:1204.4 (2010); Me. Rev. Stat. tit 17, § 1151 (2010); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
265, § 39 (2010), id. ch. 22C, §§ 32–35; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-111, -113 (2010); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 41.690 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 651:6, 21:49 (2010); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 485.00-05,
240.30-31 (McKinney 2010); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 200.50 (McKinney 2010); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-38
(2010); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (2010); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.014 (West
2010); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.47 (West 2010); Wis. Stat. § 939.645 (2010).
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establish a bias-crime law, none has passed. Of concern was the inclusion of sexual
orientation as one of the protected classes.216

B. Gay Panic Defense
In Aaron McKinney’s trial for the murder of Matthew Shepard, the defense
team attempted to use a version of the “gay panic” defense.217 As in every state,
Wyoming’s criminal law is very specific about acceptable defense strategies.218 The
defense counsel argued the defendant was unable to form the specific intent to
commit first-degree murder. Instead, his actions and state of mind at the time
of the crime indicated he had committed voluntary manslaughter. The defense
therefore asked the court to allow lay witnesses to attest to the defendant’s
“homosexual abuse at the age of five years, and again at the age of seven years, and
that he had homosexual experiences in his teenage years.”219
In his ruling against the defense motion, Judge Voigt addressed several aspects
of the motion. First, Judge Voigt stated that the admission of witnesses would
be inconsequential because they were lay rather than expert witnesses: “At least
with expert testimony and a recognized syndrome, such as the battered woman
syndrome, there might be something to make the testimony relevant.”220 He also
emphasized the legal elements of “provocation” and “specific intent” in relation

Sixteen states have passed hate crime laws or have anti-hate crime rulings that do not include
crimes based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Ala. Code § 13A-5-13 (2010); Alaska Stat.
§ 12.55.155 (2010); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7902 (2010); Ind. Code §§ 5-2-5-1, 5-3-5-14.3
(2010); Miss Code Ann. §§ 99-19-301, -303, -305, -307 (2010); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-5-221
to -222 (2010); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-3 (2010); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-14-05, -04 (2010);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.12 (West 2010); Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1506.9 (2010); 71 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 250 (2010); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8309, 9720; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2710, 3307, 5509;
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-19B-1 (2010); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.3 (West 2010); Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-57 (2010); W. Va. Code § 61-6-21 (2010); see People v. Diaz, 727 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup.
Ct. 2001).
Jared Miller, State Avoids Hate Crime Legislation, Casper Star Trib., Oct. 11, 2008, http://
trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_d636eb76-665b-5593-b186-f69a96d32a37.html.
216

217
Decision Letter from Judge Barton Voigt, Eighth Judicial Dist. of Wyo., to Cal Rerucha,
Albany Cnty. Attorney, Dion James Custis, Assistant Pub. Defender, Jason M. Tangeman, Attorney
at Law (Oct. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Decision Letter] (on file with author). Judge Voigt titled this
section “homosexual panic.” Id. at 4 n.5.

Examples in Wyoming include “not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency” as
defined under Rule 11(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Procedure and sections 7-11-301 to -307 of
the Wyoming Statutes. Self defense can be used to justify a homicide. Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726
(Wyo. 1963). Battered women syndrome is also recognized as an affirmative defense of self-defense.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-203 (2010). Voluntary intoxication may negate the specific intent element
of a particular crime, leaving the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense. Id. § 6-1-202(a).
218

219

Decision Letter, supra note 217, at 1.

220

Id. at 4 n.5.
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to the defense request.221 Specifically, he reiterated the Wyoming standard of an
objective rather than subjective test for provocation.222 Further, he explained that
the defense team’s alternate subjective test would have allowed any
stimulus that happened to “set off ” a defendant [to] be a defense
to the malice element of both first and second degree murder. If
a defendant has a low tolerance for letting his wife stay late at
the bar, killing her would just be manslaughter. That cannot be
the law.223
Next, in relation to the requirements for “specific intent,” the court looked
to the Wyoming Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. These allow a defendant to
produce any relevant evidence on an issue.224 Such relevant evidence is defined
as “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable.”225 The
defense argued that the defendant’s youthful homosexual experiences made more
probable his formation of the specific intent to kill, and therefore the evidence
was relevant and should be admitted.226 However, citing Wyoming Rule of
Evidence 403, which permits the disallowance of relevant “evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury,” Judge Voigt rejected the defendant’s
motion, stating:
[T]here is nothing from which the jury could conclude that
these homosexual experiences had any negating effect upon the
formation of a specific intent. If anything, the proffered evidence
may suggest to the jury that the Defendant had a motive to
kill Matthew Shepard. Of greater concern is the probability
that this evidence will confuse the issues and mislead the jury.
Provocation, which is what the evidence is really submitted to
prove goes to malice, not specific intent, and is an objective,
rather than a subjective test. . . . [W]hat the Defendant is trying
to do is raise a mental status defense that is not recognized by
Wyoming law, and of which there has been no notice and no
opportunity for the Court or opposing counsel to consider
before trial.227

221

Id. at 4–5.

222

Id. at 5.

223

Id. at 4.

224

Id.

225

Id.

226

Id.

227

Id. at 5.
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Finally, to emphasize this point, Judge Voigt ended his decision letter by quoting
Dressler, When Heterosexual Men Kill:
The Court is not yet convinced that a manslaughter instruction
will even be given in this case. Such an instruction is not
appropriate in a case that turns out to be a premeditated gay
bashing or robbery disguised as homosexual rage.228
Ultimately, however, the court allowed the defense to argue the jury should
find the defendant guilty of only manslaughter by allowing two witnesses to speak
of their own negative reactions to Shepard’s sexual advances.229 The implication was
that red-blooded American men like McKinney could reasonably be expected to
react to such overtures with violence.230 While the jury dismissed these arguments
by finding McKinney guilty of second-degree and felony murder, “a less sagacious
jury may have been swayed by the gay panic defense, to the extent that it was
successfully smuggled into the case, and come to a different conclusion.”231

VI. Conclusion
Virtually every day brings a new twist to the law or debates about gay rights
in the United States. The questions abound: Should we abandon or strengthen
prohibitions on gay marriage and gay and lesbian soldiers’ participation in the
military? Should we expand our federal anti-discrimination language to include
sexual orientation and gender identity? Should same-sex families be afforded the
same rights as different-sex families to adopt and foster children? As this article
illustrates, Wyoming is part of the conversation happening around the nation.
We have many LGBT citizens in the state, most of whom live and work in our
communities, and many of whom are raising children. However, currently they
are not afforded the same rights under the law as are heterosexual citizens. While
this article has shown that little case or statutory law exists on these issues, it
has also demonstrated that the Wyoming Constitution is expansive in its equal
protection language. The time has come for the “Equality State” to step up and
show its historical true colors by granting its LGBT citizens the equality and
protections proclaimed by its Constitution.

228

Id. at 6 (citations omitted).

229

Catherine Connolly, Matthew’s Murderers’ Defense, Gay & Lesbian Rev., Jan.–Feb. 2001,

at 25.
230
Id. at 26; see also Loffreda, supra note 198, at ch. 5. See generally Cynthia Lee, The Gay
Panic Defense, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 471 (2008).
231

Connolly, supra note 229, at 26.
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